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First of all, I would like to thank Professor Macpherson for his lucid and motivating remarks. In
what follows, I will limit myself to four critical observations raised by my commentator.
Macpherson highlights that: “Santibanez does not take the further step of saying this
explicitly. At the same time, the language used by the author throughout the paper suggests that
he may assent to the claim that such lies are morally wrong: For example, even when discussing
more benign forms of deception such as deceiving oneself into believing that they are a very
good professor or a soccer player’s deceiving their opponents about their intent, there is
reference to ‘damage’ and to the ‘victim’ of the deception. The concepts of damage and
victimization tend to be seen in a negative moral light.” My clarification of this would be:
Technically, every time a deception reaches its goal, then there is damage. Certainly, there are
many contexts where those damages are constitutive rules. This happens in any sport played with
balls (tennis, soccer, basketball, etc.), this is to say, in order to proceed properly within the game,
one is expected to behave deceptively. Not only is it accepted behaviour, but rather a behaviour
needed to reach a high level of performance. Another context is when an agent deceives in order
to defend himself from an aggressive environment or agents. This is also the case for animals,
where deceptive behaviour is constitutive to their lives, and in violent contexts and situations
among humans (the Nazi’s being the most extreme case). In the latter parameters, aggressiveness
from both sides – one to attack, the other to defend – is part of deceptive behaviours which are
not only accepted, but also expected (for sure, the Nazi’s army and intelligence forces took for
granted that they would be misled by the people and countries they occupied who tried to avoid
their actions). The communicative system in those contexts is so corrupted that any kind of
behaviour of the family of generalized deception can be performed (lies, deceptions, selfdeceptions, manipulations). The same goes for lying: in some games lies are constitutive rules
(card games, board games in general); but also in interpersonal relationships where one of the
agents is being abused, thus the only way to cope with it is by lying in many specific situations
or contingencies.
My commentator also states: “A further implication of the model that Santibanez appears
to reject but that Kurzban (2012) accepts is that agents use whatever module is most
advantageous in the context and that this is simply the way we are set up by nature via the
mechanism of evolution.” I do not reject Kurzban’s proposal, if this was the impression, I would
like to add here that I accept Kurzban’s angle with conditions or specifications. There are many
automatic behaviours that are commanded by System 1 of the mind, whose results are not only
correct but necessary in daily life. The difficult problem is when the agent confronts scenarios
that demand further reflexive effort. In these latter cases, the modularity model should not
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prevail straightforwardly in the analysis, because social and cultural parameters must also be
incorporated to understand why some behaviours or beliefs are automatically accepted to be
correct.
The third critical remark of Professor Macpherson is the following: “As noted above,
Santibanez cites manipulative lying as being a potentially undesirable type of lying given that the
recipients can suffer ongoing harm. I do not disagree with this claim, putting aside the issue of
modularity, although what I disagree with is Santibanez’s further claim that the aim of
argumentation theory with respect to manipulative lying “would be to have the liar justify
himself and, for this reason, make a fool of himself.” (Santibanez, 2016, p. 23). My point here is
that advancing constant critical doubts towards the manipulative behaviour of an agent will
increase the chances of observing the hidden intentions of the agent, making his justifications
more complex and unrealistic, such as the two examples given in my paper show clearly.
Professor Macpherson goes into conclude that: “… I have argued that there is reason to
believe that the modularity thesis, or some version of it, is true. This is based on empirical
studies. Then the whole notion of self-deceit, deceit of others and lying has to be either dropped
or re-worked to cohere with the modularity thesis.” Certainly, the whole family of deceptive
behaviours must be carefully studied, but modularity theory is not the only theory to be
considered to achieve good results, but rather a broader theory in which the effects of all kinds of
deception are taken into account. Manipulations, for example, are not to be explained only from
the point of view of the producer, but on the contrary, mainly from the point of view of the
receiver. Otherwise, if its effects are not considered, we will have an incomplete theory of
generalized deception, such as my schema of manipulation tried to show.
I would like to thank Professor Macpherson for his detailed extended bibliography used
to criticise my paper, which gives me the opportunity to improve my ideas and learn more about
a real problem that argumentation theory should confront in order to be closer to daily
argumentative practices.
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